Toward a Market Model for Bayesian Inference by Pennock, David M. & Wellman, Michael P.
Toward a Market Model for Bayesian Inference 405 
Toward a Market Model for Bayesian Inference 
David M. Pennock and Michael P. Wellman 
University of Michigan 
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory 
1101 Beal Avenue 
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-2110 USA 
{dpennock,wellman}@umich.edu 
Abstract 
We present a methodology for represent­
ing probabilistic relationships in a general­
equilibrium economic model. Specifically, we 
define a precise mapping from a Bayesian net­
work with binary nodes to a market price sys­
tem where consumers and producers trade 
in uncertain propositions. We demonstrate 
the correspondence between the equilibrium 
prices of goods in this economy and the prob­
abilities represented by the Bayesian net­
work. A computational market model such 
as this may provide a useful framework for in­
vestigations of belief aggregation, distributed 
probabilistic inference, resource allocation 
under uncertainty, and other problems of de­
centralized uncertainty. 
1 GENERAL MOTIVATIONS 
A principled market model for Bayesian inference 
would potentially address a variety of important and 
interesting problems of distributed uncertain reason­
ing. Although the particular contributions of our work 
to date do not deliver on these general problems, we 
present the big picture at the outset as underlying mo­
tivation for our specific developments. 
There are several reasons one might want to build mar­
kets for probabilistic reasoning. Researchers in un­
certain reasoning are likely to be acquainted with the 
first two aims enumerated in sections below. The third 
may be more familiar to those with some background 
in economics. The approach we follow in this work 
owes much to both economic theory (especially general 
equilibrium under uncertainty) and uncertain reason­
ing technology (especially Bayesian networks). 
1.1 AGGREG ATING BELIEFS 
Given several agents with incompatible beliefs, how 
can we aggregate their individual beliefs into a char­
acterization of the group's beliefs? This is a clas­
sical question in uncertain reasoning, one that has 
eluded definitive answers despite the research atten­
tion it has attracted (Genest and Zidek 1986). Al­
though we doubt that definitive solutions are forth­
coming from any quarter, we point out that market 
mechanisms of various sorts are widely used in un­
certain contexts, and their function as aggregators of 
belief are well-recognized. For example, the price of 
a stock represents the "market evaluation" of the ex­
pected present value of future dividends, and odds in 
a horse race aggregate the bettors' beliefs about the 
winning horse's identity. 
Despite their commonality and well-developed under­
lying theory, there appear to have been few attempts in 
the uncertain reasoning community at principled ap­
plication of market ideas for belief aggregation. Specif­
ically, to our knowledge, nobody has proposed a com­
prehensive market architecture for belief aggregation.1 
1.2 DISTRIBUTED PROB A BILISTIC 
INFERENCE A ND DECISION UNDER 
UNCERTA INTY 
Belief aggregation is an instance of the more general 
problem of coordinating belief and decision among a 
collection of agents. If probabilistic information is dis­
tributed across multiple sources, we face the problem 
of combining this information to address queries and 
decisions dependent on disparate pieces. 
1though Hanson (1991) has presented an informed ar­
gument for, and preliminary investigation of, the idea. In 
particular, he has advocated setting up a market in sci­
entific claims, where prices summarize consensus opinions 
about important research questions (Hanson 1995). A pro­
totype of this "Idea Futures" market is in operation on the 
World-Wide Web, at http://if.arc.ab.ca/IF.shtml. 
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Much work in uncertain reasoning is amenable to dis­
tribution, and indeed, belief propagation mechanisms 
are often specifically designed for this purpose. Market 
mechanisms likewise are directly geared toward decen­
tralization, in particular for situations where the par­
ticipating modules are viewed as rational agents (Well­
man 1995). Understanding the decentralization in 
markets for uncertain propositions can perhaps lead to 
new distributed reasoning schemes, or improvements 
in existing schemes. 
1.3 RESOURCE ALLOCATION UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY 
Real markets involve substantial uncertainty. Agents 
making decisions in markets often have to commit to 
consumption or production plans without an ability 
to predict perfectly the outcomes of those plans. This 
state of uncertainty may be shared by the agents, or 
each may have different uncertain beliefs. The resource 
allocation problem under uncertainty includes alloca­
tion of risks, distributing the consequences of this un­
certainty throughout the system. 
Economics has developed a substantial body of the­
ory addressing uncertainty in markets. The standard 
theory of general equilibrium under uncertainty posits 
contingent goods-goods that are available only if par­
ticular uncertain events are realized. A security is a 
particular kind of contingent good with varying mone­
tary (or real-good) payoffs based on the revealed value 
of some uncertain state. One of the key results of 
this theory is that an economy with a sufficient set 
of securities markets possesses the classical properties 
of competitive equilibrium (i.e., existence, uniqueness, 
Pareto optimality) under conditions identical to that 
for the case of certainty (essentially, convexity and con­
tinuity of preferences and technologies). See a stan­
dard text on microeconomic theory (e.g., Mas-Colell, 
et a!. (1995)) for the precise statement and detailed 
development of these concepts. 
To be sufficient, a set of securities markets must span 
the set of possible states of nature, 0. This requires 
in general 0(101) securities. If the set of markets is 
incomplete, allocations dictated by the price system 
may be inefficient (i.e., Pareto dominated), even if the 
economy is otherwise well-behaved. 
Of course, research in uncertain reasoning is largely 
concerned with representing beliefs over 0, and one of 
the major ideas is that structure in this set may lead to 
more compact and otherwise advantageous specifica­
tions. In particular, we typically structureD by factor­
ing it into a product of random variables, and achieve 
savings in encoding (e.g., in Bayesian networks) by ex­
ploiting independence among the random variables. 
A natural question, then, is whether ideas about struc­
turing probabilistic relations among random variables 
can be exploited in the design of configurations of se­
curities markets. We believe the work presented below 
provides evidence for an answer in the affirmative. 
2 OVERVIEW 
In this paper we present one approach toward building 
a market system for Bayesian inference. We propose a 
market structure to represent a joint probability distri­
bution over a set of binary random variables. Specifi­
cally, we delineate a precise mapping from a Bayesian 
network to an economy, where consumers and pro­
ducers exchange goods representing uncertain propo­
sitions. The resulting system, called MarketBayes, is 
shown to effectively "compute" the same probabilistic 
information as the original Bayesian network. While 
this paper focuses on the particulars of the Market­
Hayes construction, our aim is not the constructed 
market system per se, but rather its use as a foun­
dation for future investigations of the broader issues 
entertained above. 
In the next section, we provide some general back­
ground on the microeconomic framework employed. In 
Section 4, we introduce the MarketBayes model, begin­
ning with the basic agents and goods that comprise 
our market structure. The complete mapping from 
Bayesian networks to market structures is presented 
in Section 5, along with some theorems characterizing 
the correspondence between the resulting market price 
system and the original joint probability distribution. 
We illustrate the method further by example in Sec­
tion 6, and conclude in the subsequent section with a 
discussion and assessment of our results. 
3 ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS 
3.1 GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
FRAMEWORK 
A market price system is defined by a set of K goods 
indexed 1, ... , K and a price vector p = (PI, ... , PK) 
that associates a price with each good. The system 
requires that all goods be exchanged in proportion to 
their relative prices. 
Goods are exchanged by two types of agents­
consumers and producers. Consumer agents re­
ceive value from direct consumption of the goods 
(metaphorically, they "eat" the goods). Let x = 
(xi, . . . , XK) denote a consumption bundle where each 
Xi E �+ specifies the quantity of good i consumed. 
The consumption bundles are ranked according to 
preference by the consumer's utility function u(x) : 
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at:f - �. Consumers also start with an initial allo­
cation of the goods, termed their endowment and de­
noted by e = ( e1, ... , ex). The consumer's objective 
is to choose an affordable bundle of goods, x, so as to 
maximize its utility. A bundle is affordable if its total 
cost at the going prices does not exceed the value of the 
consumer's endowment at the same prices. The con­
sumer's choice can thus be expressed as the following 
constrained optimization problem: 
max u(x) s.t. p · x � p ·e. (1) X 
Agents of the second type, producers, extract value 
from goods by transforming them into other goods, 
and selling their product in the market. A producer's 
ability to transform goods is defined by its technology, 
Y C �K, which specifies the set of feasible produc­
tion vectors. If y = (y1, . . . , YK) is feasible, then the 
producer is capable of transforming bundles of input 
goods (goods i for which y; < 0) into bundles of output 
goods (y; > 0), in respective amounts IYd. 
Unlike the consumer, a producer has no preferences 
in the sense of agent-specific desires. Rather, we as­
sume that a producer selects its production activity 
solely according to profit-the difference between the 
value of its output and the cost of its input, evaluated 
at a given set of prices. The producer's constrained 
optimization problem can be expressed succinctly as 
maxp · y s.t. y E Y. 
y 
(2) 
An agent is competitive if it takes prices as given, ig­
noring the potential effect of its own choices on re­
sulting prices. The agent definitions above assume 
competitive behavior, in that the prices are treated 
as parameters of the respective optimization prob­
lems. Note that only relative prices matter; behav­
ior is unchanged if all prices are multiplied by a posi­
tive constant. We typically scale prices by designating 
one good (the first, without loss of generality) as nu­
meraire, with a fixed price, PI = 1. 
Consider an economy with consumers indexed 1, . . . , m 
and producers indexed m + 1, . . . , n. A competitive 
equilibrium for this economy is a set of prices, p, such 
that all of the goods are in material balance, 
where xi and yi denote the solutions of consumer or 
producer i's respective optimization problem, as de­
fined above, at prices p. 
3.2 CONTINGENT GOODS 
In economic theory, uncertainty is addressed by intro­
ducing contingent goods, whose tangible realization 
depends on some uncertain event. In the standard 
model, trading is divided into two periods. In the first 
period (before uncertainty is resolved) agents trade ex­
clusively in securities. After uncertainty is resolved, 
agents trade in the real goods, using income from their 
securities holdings. 
Since we are developing a market for uncertainty in 
the abstract (i.e., no explicit real goods), we consider 
a one-stage model, with the securities treated as if nor­
mal goods. Consider a security that pays one "dollar" 
if an uncertain proposition a is true, and nothing oth­
erwise. If an agent is risk neutral for dollars, then its 
valuation of this good is exactly that of having Pr(a) 
dollars. If dollar is the numeraire, then the price at 
which the agent would be indifferent between buying 
one unit of the contingent good and one dollar is ex­
actly Pr( a). Thus, the equilibrium price in this in­
stance corresponds with the probability. 
More generally, we interpret the price of a good as 
"the market probability" for that good. If participat­
ing consumers have different assessments of the proba­
bility, then their relative wealth and risk aversion will 
determine their influence on the equilibrium price. 
The market structure we define below is comprised en­
tirely of contingent goods of the form: "$1 if a", for 
propositions of interest a. We specify preferences over 
these goods directly, rather than assigning beliefs in 
the propositions and preferences for dollars. Our selec­
tion of which propositions to include and our definition 
of the participating agents are designed to achieve an 
equilibrium where the prices correspond to a specified 
probability distribution. 
4 MARKETBAYES BUILDING 
BLOCKS 
The MarketBayes model is a particular approach we 
have developed to represent joint probability distribu­
tions over sets of binary random variables in terms 
of general-equilibrium economic systems. The market 
representation is designed to exploit conditional inde­
pendencies among propositions, based on the struc­
ture of a Bayesian network. Specifically, we present a 
mapping from a Bayesian network with binary proposi­
tional nodes to an "equivalent" configuration of goods, 
consumers, and producers. In this section, we present 
the basic economic constructs that form the building 
blocks of the MarketBayes economy. Section 5 presents 
the complete mapping, and characterizes the corre­
spondence between the resulting market price system 
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and the original Bayesian network. 
We represent propositions formed from conjunctions of 
nodes in the network as contingent goods in the econ­
omy. Let a be a proposition, and (a} the corresponding 
good in the market model. We also use the notation 
(a) as a variable denoting the price of the good; the 
specific interpretation is resolvable in context. By de­
sign the equilibrium price of the good should equal 
the probability of the corresponding proposition, i.e., 
(a) = Pr(a). We define next the MarketBayes con­
sumers and producers employed in pursuit of this equi­
librium behavior. 
4.1 THE CONSUMERS 
In a Bayesian network, the basic unit of information is 
a conditional probability. For example, a node a2 with 
sole predecessor a1 is accompanied by the information 
Pr(a21at) = k where k is some probability. Using the 
definition of conditional probability, the same equation 
can be rewritten as Pr(a1a2) = k Pr(a l ). In the Mar­
ketBayes economy, we wish to enforce the same ratio 
between the prices of the goods: 
(3) 
Our approach to maintaining this relation is to intro­
duce a consumer that considers the relative value of 
the good (a1a2) to be k times the value of the good 
(a I). If the ratio of the prices diverges from k, the 
consumer will buy or sell accordingly, tending to drive 
the ratio toward k. 
The MarketBayes model employs CES (constant elas­
ticity of substitution) consumers for this purpose. The 
CES utility function for two goods takes the form2 
u(x1,x2)= (at(xt(;1 +a2(x2)";1) .. :1, (4) 
where the ai are coefficients dictating the relative val­
ues of the two goods, and rr is a global substitution 
parameter dictating the degree to which consumption 
in one good (at proportions dictated by the a; ) can 
substitute for the other. 
Let p1 and p2 be the prices of the two goods. The 
consumer's optimization problem (1), as usual, is to 
maximize its utility function ( 4) subject to its budget 
constraint. For CES consumers this problem has a 
closed-form solution: 
Pt"(at"Pt1-" + a2"P21-") 
0!2°(p1e1 + P2e2) 
P2"(at"Pt1-" + a2"P21-") 
(5) 
(6) 
2CES forms are commonly employed in general equililr 
rium modeling (Shoven and Whalley 1992), due to their 
flexibility and convenient analytical properties. 
To implement an equation of the form (3), we in­
troduce a CES consumer interested in the two goods 
(a1a2} and {ai}. The consumer is endowed with an 
equal amount e1 = e2 = e of each good (the exact 
value does not matter for the current purpose, as long 
as e > 0). By setting a1 = k and a2 = 1, we encode 
the desired conditional probability. Although the re­
lation is strictly enforced (according to Theorem 1 be­
low) only as � ---> oo, we have found in practice that 
convergence to the correct price ratio typically obtains 
for values of u > 4 or so. 
Theorem 1 Let (a1a2}* and (a1}* be equilibrium 
prices for the two goods in an economy containing 
the CES consumer defined above, with rr - 00. If 
lirn,....,00 ({' a)f is finite and bounded away from zero, 
a1 
then it is k. 
Proof (sketch). In competitive equilibrium, by defini­
tion, the consumer is solving its optimization problem. 
The first-order conditions for that optimization prob­
lem dictate that the marginal utility per unit price be 
constant across goods. In particular, 
..£!!_ 8u 8r1 8rl 
(a1a2)• 
= 
{at)*· 
Substituting the marginal utilities and rearranging, 
1 
(
k(xt)� + (x2)�) � k(xt)-� 
_1_ 
(
k(xt) .. ;1 +(x2)";1 ) "-• (x2)-;} 
k(xi)-;} 
(x2)-;} ' 
which approaches k as u - oo, as long as the Xi are 
bounded away from zero. For CES consumers, this will 
be true as long as the price ratio is finite and bounded 
away from zero. Thus, {a1a2)* = k{a1)*, which is 
Equation (3) exactly. 0 
The alert reader may observe that the same result 
could have been obtained more directly using the lin­
ear utility function , u(x1, x2) = kx1 + x2. Indeed, the 
CES utility function approaches linearity in the limit. 
However, with linear utility the equilibrium would be 
more fragile-two consumers with different k would 
prevent existence. Moreover, for linear utility func­
tions the optimal demand function is discontinuous in 
prices, and reaching equilibrium through a distributed, 
incremental bidding process becomes more difficult. 
Note that Theorem 1 requires only that there exist one 
such CES consumer. It is true vacuously when there 
is no equilibrium. For situations with more than one 
CES consumer connecting the same pair of goods with 
differing k values, the result still holds because we take 
the u for only one of them to infinity. 
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4.2 THE PRODUCERS 
Whereas the role of consumers in a Market Bayes econ­
omy is to encode conditional probabilities, we employ 
producers to implement identities of probability the­
ory. Producers act as arbitrageurs, converting between 
logically equivalent bundles of goods.3 For example, 
the propositional identity 
can be expressed in a producer with the technology to 
convert a unit of (at} into one unit each of (ata2} and 
(ata2}, or vice versa. This producer's technology ex­
hibits constant returns to scale, that is, it can perform 
this transform at any volume level. 
The corresponding probabilistic identity, Pr(at) = 
Pr(ata2)+Pr(ata2), can likewise be expressed in terms 
of a constraint on prices of goods: 
(7) 
The arbitrageur effectively enforces this equation by 
its bidding policy. If the price (at} diverges from the 
sum {a1a2} + {a1a2}, the producer can make profits by 
transforming one side to the other. Its resulting de­
mand behavior will tend to drive the respective input 
and output prices towards equality. 
The producer's goal is to maximize profits (2). For 
the producer associated with the identity above, the 
profits when transforming y units of {al) into y each 
of (a1a2) and {a1a2) (note that if y is negative, the 
transformation goes the other way) are simply 
(8) 
Theorem 2 Let (a1)•, (a1a2}", and (ata2}* be the 
equilibrium prices for the three goods in an economy 
containing the arbitrage producer defined above. Then 
(at)• = (a1a2)• + (a1a2)•. 
Proof. Competitive producers must be maximizing 
profits in equilibrium. But the profit function (8) has a 
bounded maximizer y (finite production) only if Equa­
tion 7 holds. 0 
Note that the producer always makes zero profit in 
equilibrium (this is true in general for competitive, 
constant-returns producers). Results analogous to 
Theorem 2 can be derived for arbitrageurs representing 
identities of the form (7) but with arbitrary numbers 
of propositions on the right-hand side. 
30ur expression of the laws of probability in arbi­
trageurs can be viewed as a direct embodiment of Nau and 
McCardle's argument (1991) that all rationality or coher­
ence principles ultimately reduce to "no-arbitrage" postu­
lates. 
5 THE MARKETBAYES S YS TEM 
In this section we piece together the individual compo­
nents described above into an interconnected market 
price system. We describe a general mapping from a 
Bayesian network with binary nodes to a MarketBayes 
configuration of goods, consumers, and producers. We 
show how the economy effectively represents the same 
information as the Bayesian network. 
We are interested in three general properties that such 
a mapping may possess. 
Property 1 (Existence) There exists a competitive 
equilibrium in the MarketBayes economy such that the 
price of each good equals the probability of the corre­
sponding proposition in the Bayesian network. 
Property 2 (Uniqueness) There is a unique com­
petitive equilibrium in the MarketBayes economy, sat­
isfying the conditions of Properly 1. 
Property 3 (Convergence) The unique competi­
tive equilibrium of the MarketBayes economy can be 
derived via an iterative, distr ibuted bidding process, 
such as tatonnement or variants {Mas-Co/ell, Whin­
ston, and Green 1995; Cheng and Wellman 1996). 
Each property subsumes the previous and, in general, 
the properties are successively harder to verify. In the 
following sections, we construct the MarketBayes econ­
omy incrementally in two stages. After stage one, we 
prove that Property 1 holds; after stage two we prove 
that Property 2 holds. The goods in the economy­
specified in Section 5 .1-remain constant across both 
stages. In Section 5.2, we define stage one of the map­
ping, a set of consumers sufficient to establish the Ex­
istence Property for arbitrary Bayesian networks. In 
Section 5.3 we define stage two of the mapping, adding 
producers to the economy to ensure the Uniqueness 
Property for a non-restrictive class of Bayesian net­
works. We do not yet have a general proof of the Con­
vergence Property (except for complete graphs, not 
presented) , but we conjecture that our price adjust­
ment algorithm (Cheng and Wellman 1996) does con­
verge for a broad class of MarketBayes economies. Our 
computational experience thus far supports this con­
jecture, and in Section 6 we present a concrete exam­
ple that does indeed converge when implemented as a 
computational economy. 
5.1 THE GOODS 
The goods in a MarketBayes economy are conjunctions 
of literals, each the value of a node in the Bayesian 
network. However, rather than include all such con­
junctions explicitly as goods, we attempt to exploit the 
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independencies present in a (possibly sparse) Bayesian 
network graph. 
Let a1, ... , an be nodes in a Bayesian network. Denote 
the parents of node a; by a;1, • • •  , a;q. For each node 
a; in the network we add to the economy goods for all 
2q+1 possible conjunctions of a; and its parents:4 
We also add to the economy all 2q possible conjunc­
tions of the parents of a; alone, if these goods are not 
already included in those defined previously. 
(a· ···a· ) {a· ··--a· ) {a· ··· a· ) i 1 1 q ' '11 lq ' • • • ' It lq 
Finally we add a single good (T) which corresponds 
to the proposition true. {T) is the numeraire of the 
economy and thus its price is 1 by definition. 
The economy then consists of 0(2qn) goods, where q 
is the maximum number of parents for a node and n 
is the number of nodes. 
5.2 STAGE ONE: THE CONSUMERS 
For each node a;, the given Bayesian network pro­
vides us with 2q conditional probabilities, of the form 
Pr(a;lahai� ···a;. ) = k. These conditional probabili­
ties dictate that the following 2q ratios between prices 
of goods must hold: 
(a·a· a· ···a· ) I It I� l.q 
k1(a· a· · .. a· ) 11 .. '] lq 
k2(a· a· ···a· ) 11 il lq 
k2o{a· a· ... a· ) It ll lq 
(9) 
From the above equations, it is trivial to derive the 
complementary equations that contain a;: 
<a·a· a· .. ·a· ) I 11 l::i lq 
{a·a- a· ···a· ) I 1; 1 1� lq 
(1- k1)(a· a· ···a· ) 11 '14! lq 
(1- k2)(a· a· ···a· ) .. 1 �-� lq 
(10) 
Root nodes in the Bayesian network can be handled 
in the same way by considering them to be children of 
the proposition true, with "conditional" probability 
Pr(a;ltrue) = k. 
In the MarketBayes model, CES consumers effectively 
implement equations of the form (9) and (10). Specif­
ically, we add 2 · 2q consumers to the economy for each 
node a;-one for each of the equations in (9) and (10). 
The consumers are instantiated as described in Sec­
tion 4.1. 
�Though each node may have a different number of par­
ents, we conserve subscripts and use q for the number of 
parents of the current node. 
Theorem 3 Property 1 (Existence) holds for the 
mapping from any Bayesian network to the set of goods 
and consumers defined above. 
Proof. We need to show that the probabilities of 
propositions in the Bayesian network form a (possi­
bly nonunique) price equilibrium in the MarketBayes 
economy. A set of prices constitutes an equilibrium 
if the resulting demand is in material balance, that 
is, there is no excess demand in the economy at 
those prices. Probabilities represented by the Bayesian 
network obey the ratios described in Equations (9) 
and (10), by construction. Then it suffices to show 
that any set of prices that satisfies these equations im­
plies zero excess demand in the economy. Consider 
the CES consumer associated with the first condi­
tional probability in (9). Let Pl = (aiai1 a;� · · · a;9) 
and P2 ::::: (ai, ai, · · · aiq ) be the prices of the two rel­
evant goods. From (9) we have that P1 = k1P2· The 
demands for each good (from (5) and (6)) are then: 
k111(k1p2e +p2e) 
P211(k1 11(k1p2)1-o- + P21-11) 
pze(kl + 1) pze(kl + 1) 
- -e P2k1 + P2 P2(k1 + 1) -
In other words, at the specified price ratio, the con­
sumer demands exactly the amounts it is endowed 
with. Since the same argument applies to every con­
sumer in the economy, the total excess demand must 
be zero. Thus, any set of prices that satisfies (9) 
and (10) constitutes a competitive equilibrium for the 
economy, and the Existence Property is established. D 
Note that this result does not require u -+ oo, as did 
Theorem 1. If consumers other than the ones speci­
fied in our construction are present, then the network 
probabilities may not constitute a price equilibrium. 
5.3 STAGE TWO: THE PRODUCERS 
Although the existence of an equilibrium correspond­
ing to the probability distribution is somewhat encour­
aging, the MarketBayes construction will be of limited 
use if other, incorrect, probabilities can also represent 
an equilibrium. In this section we extend the econ­
omy to ensure the Uniqueness Property. To do so, we 
must in general add some consumers and producers to 
enforce the remaining constraints. 
Figure 1: A section of a moral Bayesian network. 
Undirected links could be oriented either way. 
A graph is moral if every two parents of a node are 
connected ("married"), for all nodes in the graph. 5 
Forests (collections of trees) are a subset of moral 
graphs, since every node has at most one parent. Com­
plete graphs are also a subset of moral graphs since ev­
ery two nodes are connected. Any graph can be moral­
ized by adding directed links in the graph between ev­
ery two unconnected parent nodes, making sure to re­
tain the acyclic nature of the network. Adding new di­
rected links introduces new parent relationships which 
in turn may require additional "moralization" links. 
Thus, in principle the MarketBayes mapping applies 
to arbitrary network structures. However, the process 
of moralization introduces, in the worst case, an expo­
nential number of additional conditional relationships. 
As above, let at, ... , an be the nodes of the Bayesian 
network. Without loss of generality, we can assume 
the index labels on the nodes are consistent with the 
partial order represented by the directed graph: if a; is 
an ancestor of aj then i < j. Note that at is always a 
root node (no parents) and an is always a leaf node (no 
children). Since the network is moral, the parents of 
a;-a;1, • • •  , a;9 -form a complete subset of the graph. 
Furthermore, (taking, again without loss of generality, 
it < · · · < iq), the nodes a;1, a;l, • • •  , a;9_1 must all be 
parents of the node a;0• Let W; be the set of parents 
of the node a;. that are not also parents of a;. This 
structure is depicted in Figure 1. 
The set W; represents the additional nodes required to 
specify a joint distribution over the parents of a;. For 
each node a;, we generate arbitrageurs (according to 
the scheme of Section 4.2) representing the following 
probabilistic identities: 
(a· a · ···a· ) I 1 14 lq 
(a· a· ···a· ) •• �� 1-q 
(a· a· . .  ·a· ) '• l:;i lq 
(11) 
5The term "moral" in the literature typically refers to 
the undirected moral relative of a directed graph (N eapoli­
tan 1990}. In this paper we use the term as defined above 
to describe directed graphs only. 
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The summations are over all possible combinations of 
the propositions in the set W;. Note that if the set 
W; is empty for some i, then we need not add any 
producers to the economy for node a;. If the Bayesian 
network is a complete graph, then the set W; will be 
empty for all i; in this case producers are simply not 
necessary. 
Theorem 4 Property 2 (Uniqueness) holds for the 
mapping from any moral Bayesian network to the set 
of goods, consumers, and producers defined above. 
Proof. From Theorems 1 and 2 it is clear that the 
consumer equations in (9) and (10), along with the 
producer equations in (11), must hold simultaneously 
in equilibrium. The probabilities of the propositions 
in the Bayesian network must satisfy these equations 
since they correspond directly to the given condi­
tional probabilities plus identities in probability the­
ory. Therefore, we need only show that there is a 
unique set of prices that satisfies this set of equations 
instantiated for the configuration of this economy. The 
proof is by induction. Let G; be the set of goods added 
to the economy for proposition a;, namely, all possi­
ble conjunctions of a; with its parents plus all possible 
conjunctions of its parents alone. Mathematically, 
G; {{a;ah ···a;.), . . .  ,(a;a;1 ·· · a;. )} U 
{(a;1···a;9}, • • •  ,(a;1 ···a;9)}. 
• Base Case. Define the set Go to be {{T) }. The 
good (T) is the numeraire and its price is main­
tained at unity by definition. Thus the price of 
the good in the set Go is uniquely determined. 
• Induction. Assume that all of the prices of goods 
in the sets Go, G1, . . .  , G;_1 are uniquely deter­
mined. We want to prove that all of the prices of 
goods in the set G; are uniquely determined. Con­
sider the general situation as depicted in Figure 1. 
The prices of the goods in the set G;. are uniquely 
determined since iq < i. Among the goods in the 
set G;9 are the goods in the sets 
U(W;a;1 a;�··· a;.), ... , U(W;a;1 a;2 • • • a;9), 
w, w, 
where Uw, is the union over all possible conjunc­
tions of the propositions in the set W;. These are 
exactly the goods on the right hand side of (11). 
Thus the prices of the goods on the left hand side 
of ( 11) must be uniquely determined. These goods 
are in turn exactly those on the right hand sides 
of (9) and (10). Thus the prices of the goods 
on the left hand sides of (9) and (10) must be 
uniquely determined. The goods on the left hand 
sides of(9), (10), and (11) are exactly those goods 
in the set G;. D 
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Figure 2: An example Bayesian network. 
Note that the price system in an equilibrium Market­
Hayes economy is sufficient to recover the complete 
joint distribution, as it specifies all conditional proba­
bilities in the original Bayesian network. 
6 AN EXAMPLE ECONOMY 
In this section we construct a concrete MarketBayes 
economy using the technique described in the previ­
ous section. We provide empirical verification of the 
system by reporting results of running the example in 
an actual computational economy. For this example, 
the prices of goods converge correctly to the probabil­
ities of the corresponding propositions in the Bayesian 
network. 
The example Bayesian network is pictured in Figure 2. 
It is already moral, so we need not add any additional 
links. Let the conditional probabilities associated with 
the example network be as follows: 
Pr(at) = 0.4 
Pr(a2lat) = 0.2 
Pr(aalata2) = 0.11 
Pr(aalata2) = 0.33 
Pr(a4laa) = 0.25 
Pr(a2lat) = 0.3 
Pr( a a lilt a2) = 0.22 
Pr(aalata2) = 0.44 
Pr(a4laa) = 0.85 
The goods in the economy consist of all combinations 
of each node with its parents, 
(at}, (at), 
(ata2), (ata2), (ata2), {ata2), 
(ata2aa), (ata2aa), (atli2aa), {ata2aa), 
(ata2aa}, {ata2aa}, (atli2aa), {ata2aa}, 
{aaa4}, {aaa4), {aaa4}, {aaa4) 
and all combinations of each node's parents alone, if 
not already included in the group above. In this ex­
ample, the combinations of the parent of node a4 still 
need to be added. 
(aa}, (aa} 
Finally we add the numeraire good {T) to the economy. 
For each conditional probability in the Bayesian net­
work we add a consumer. For this example we have 
consumers enforcing the following relationships: 
(at) � 0.4{T) 
{at a2) = 0.2{at) 
{a1a2aa) = O.ll{ata2) 
(ata2aa) = 0.33{ata2) 
{a3a4) = 0.25{aa) 
{a1a2) = 0.3{at) 
{ata2aa) = 0.22(ata2) 
{at a2aa) = 0.44(at a2) 
{aaa4) = 0.85(aa) 
We also add the complementary consumers defined by 
Equation (10). 
(at) � 0.6{T} 
(ata2) = 0.8(at) 
(ata2aa) = 0.89(ata2) 
(ata2aa) = 0.67(ata2) 
(aaa4) = 0.75{aa) 
(ata2) = 0.7(at) 
(ata2aa} = 0.78{ata2) 
(ata2aa} = 0.56(ata2} 
(aaa4) = 0.15(aa) 
Consider the first equation above, (at) = 0.4(T}. The 
CES consumer representing this relationship has an 
interest in the two goods (at) and {T), with CES a 
coefficients of 0.4 and 1, respectively. In our computa­
tional market we endow the consumer with an amount 
e = 10 of each good, and set the global substitution 
parameter cr to 50. The remaining consumers are in­
stantiated in the same way. 
For each node in the Bayesian network we add the 
arbitrage producers defined in Equation 11. In this 
example, we need to add producers only for node a4, 
since the set wi is empty for i # 4. 
{aa) = {a1a2a3) + (a1a2a3) + (a1a2a3) + (a1a2aa) 
{aa) = {a1a2aa} + (a1a2aa) + (a1a2aa} + (ata2aa) 
This collection of goods, consumers, and producers 
forms a complete MarketBayes economy. We have im­
plemented this example in our market-oriented pro­
gramming environment, WALRAS, which provides some 
general facilities for specifying computational mar­
kets (Wellman 1993). Given the specification of agents 
and goods, the WALRAS distributed bidding protocol 
attempts to find a competitive equilibrium via an asyn­
chronous, iterative, price-adjustment process (Cheng 
and Wellman 1996). In the WALRAS bidding protocol, 
each agent submits demand functions for each of the 
goods they are interested in to the auctions for the 
respective goods. The auction then sets the price so 
as to clear its market. When the prices change, the 
agents may submit new bids, and the process iterates. 
For this example economy, the MarketBayes prices in­
deed converge correctly to within 0.001 of the correct 
probabilities. 
We can also use the market results to recover probabil­
ities of propositions that are not explicitly represented 
as goods in the system. Since the conditional probabil­
ities in a Bayesian network capture the complete joint 
distribution, the probability of any propositional ex­
pression can be recovered through additions and multi­
plications of MarketBayes prices. For example, {a1a3} 
can be computed by summing {ata2a3}+{a1a2a3}. For 
simple summations like this, we can generate an ex­
plicit arbitrageur to produce the desired good. How­
ever, determining the probabilities of general expres­
sions and conditionals may require new types of agents, 
or even off-line calculations using the prices of existing 
goods. 
7 DIS CUSS ION 
In this paper, we have presented a specific technique 
for mapping a Bayesian network to a market system 
where prices are probabilities. Our market model 
encodes uncertain propositions as goods, conditional 
probabilities as consumers, and the laws of probabil­
ity as arbitrage producers. We have shown that the 
competitive equilibrium of our system is unique, and 
corresponds to the joint probability distribution rep­
resented by the original Bayesian network. 
We view the main contribution of this work to be an 
existence argument. We are fairly certain that there 
are other plausible mappings, some perhaps with ad­
vantages over the approach presented here (though we 
do believe that MarketBayes has some interesting fea­
tures!). 
The existence of a market model for Bayesian infer­
ence is the first step toward addressing some of the 
motivating research questions posed at the outset. We 
conjecture that market price systems will support a 
useful class of belief aggregation mechanisms, due to 
their high degree of decentralization, intuitive inter­
pretation of interactions, and well-developed analyt­
ical theory. Within the MarketBayes framework, we 
can specify agents with differing beliefs (preference co­
efficient, k), rigidity of belief (substitution parameter, 
o-),6 and relative importance (endowment, e) . Mar­
ketBayes aggregates these consumers to derive an in­
termediate price; in ongoing work we are investigating 
the properties of this aggregation. 
Market systems also have potential applications in dis­
tributed reasoning under uncertainty, where agents 
cannot be centrally coordinated due to high com­
munication costs, actual physical separation, security 
concerns, or other reasons. In a precise sense, the 
competitive mechanism uses minimal communication 
(prices) to achieve-in particular, well-characterized 
6 Under a suitable interpretation of the contingent 
goods, u can be considered a risk aversion parameter, with 
risk neutrality at q = oo. The more risk averse the agent, 
the more it prefers to hedge its beliefs by refraining from 
bets with positive expected payoff. 
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circumstances-Pareto optimal outcomes. 
Finally, the MarketBayes model also demonstrates 
that independence structure in uncertain belief states 
can be exploited to reduce the number of markets nec­
essary to constitute a complete configuration. This 
may prove advantageous for problems of resource al­
location under uncertainty, where the general theory 
would require unthinkable numbers of securities. 
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